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Abstract 
Based on the theories of reputation and asymmetric information, we use 5988 sample data of firms listed in 
Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges in the period 2010-2014 and apply Heckman two-stage model to 
empirically test the impact mechanism of media coverage on debt financing costs of listed companies. We 
explore the impact of media coverage on the debt financing costs of the listed companies under different 
ownership nature. The results show that, media coverage has a significant impact on debt financing costs of 
listed companies, in which, positive media coverage reduces company’s debt financing costs while negative 
media coverage increases the company’s debt financing costs. Media coverage has a different impact on debt 
financing costs of listed firms with different nature of ownership. Specifically, with respect to state-owned 
enterprises, the impact of media coverage on easing debt financing costs is more apparent on non-state-owned 
enterprises. While with respect to non-state-owned enterprises, the impact of media coverage on increasing debt 
financing costs is more apparent on state-owned enterprises. 
Keywords: Media Coverage; Debt Financing Costs; Ownership Nature; Heckman Two-stage Model. 
 
1. Introduction 
As an important source of capital for enterprise, debt financing has been deeply concerned by theory and practice 
fields (Baber, et al.2013). Theory and practice fields are also finding the ways of decreasing the cost of debt 
financing actively and they have achieved abundant research results. Present literature and research are mainly 
from the perspective of firm characteristics, macro environment and corporate governance (Bradley and Chen, 
2011; Richardson and Welker, 2001; Qian and Strahan, 2007). But few literature and research discuss the impact 
of the media on cost of debt financing in listed companies from the perspective of media, which is a unique 
informal institution. Under the catalysis of the information age, the impact of media on the management and 
decision-making in listed companies is increasingly important. As an important supervision power in capital 
market, the media plays an irreplaceable roles in corporate governance, such as improving deficiencies of 
corporate governance (Cumming, et al.2016), enhancing corporation’s performance (Liu and McConnell,2013), 
and disclosing financial fraudulence(Miller,2006). The media can play an important role of information 
intermediary. Fang and Peress’s (2009) research finds that media’s coverage can reduce information friction. 
Tetlock (2010) finds that media also plays an important role in reducing information asymmetry between 
companies and investors. Banks and other financial institutions have been monitoring the news report of the loan 
enterprise. They release enterprises’ negative reports and other external information in the system in real time in 
order to help loan department control credit risk timely. But there are not any researches in theory fields 
concerning the impact of media coverage on cost of debt financing in listed companies. Based on this, this paper 
will explore how the favorable media coverage and unfavorable media coverage can influence cost of debt 
financing in listed companies. We hope we can contribute to the research on media coverage’s effect on debt 
contract. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development  
Our research argues that media coverage may affect the cost of debt financing by the following two ways: 
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Firstly, media coverage can influence the cost of debt financing by the reputation of listed companies. In the 
credit market, a good reputation may have a significant impact on debt financing. It can provide an implicit 
contract to the capital supplier. Enterprise with a high reputation often has a lower default rate. And capital 
supplier often provides a lower interest. Positive media coverage can help enterprise create a good social 
reputation, and it is beneficial to obtain low-cost debt financing. Compared with enterprise which has favorable 
media coverage, enterprise which has unfavorable media coverage will damage their reputation invisibly. It 
caused a decrease of negotiation capability when financing. Enterprise must pay a premium as compensate for 
unfavorable media coverage. Secondly, Media coverage influences enterprises’ cost of debt financing by 
reducing information asymmetry. Information asymmetry is an important factor of debt financing contracts. 
Information asymmetry between creditors and debtors may lead to the moral hazard and adverse selection in the 
process of fulfilling the debt contract. Tetlock (2010) finds that media coverage of listed companies can 
effectively resolve information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Enterprise which media would pay 
more attention to tend to have lower degree of information asymmetry between its creditors. In this case the 
creditor has a more profound understanding of the enterprise. Compared with enterprise which has favorable 
media coverage, enterprise which has unfavorable media coverage often has a higher moral hazard. Debt 
contract between the creditor and the debtor is facing more uncertainty. In this case, in order to safeguard their 
interests. Creditors will often require the debtor to pay a rate above the market average rate. This part of the 
premium is primarily used to hedge moral hazard and uncertainties. Therefore, this paper argues that unfavorable 
media coverage will increase the cost of debt financing for enterprises. Based on this, we propose the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Favorable media coverage and debt financing costs of listed companies are negative related.  
Hypothesis 2: Unfavorable media coverage and debt financing costs of listed companies are positive related. 
Compared with non-state-owned enterprises，state-owned enterprises has a unique advantage over the debt 
financing, especially in bank credit. In economy transitional countries, credit discrimination is widespread. It is 
difficult for private enterprises to get the fair treatment in credit market from financial institutions. Cull and 
Xu(2005) find that state-owned banks take more care of the enterprises which has a good relationship with the 
government. Therefore, this paper notes that the nature of ownership plays a huge role in the relationship 
between the cost of debt financing and media coverage. Due to the credit discrimination, the cost of debt 
financing is quite different between non-state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises. Cost of debt 
financing in non-state-owned enterprises is often higher than that in the state-owned enterprises. Favorable 
media coverage of non-state-owned enterprises is more helpful than state-owned enterprises. At this time the 
favorable media coverage can reduce risk of defaulting debt more effectively than the non-state-owned 
enterprises’. The result is that the degree of favorable media coverage of non-state-owned enterprises reducing 
the cost of debt financing is greater than the degree of state-owned enterprises reducing the cost of debt 
financing. Similarly, the impact of unfavorable media coverage on state-owned enterprises is more serious than 
the impact on non-state-owned enterprises. The reason is that the special status of the state-owned enterprises 
enlarges the influence of unfavorable media coverage. Unfavorable media coverage will have an important 
impact on of financial institutions and its credit decisions. Considering the public opinion, the financial 
institutions will increase the cost of debt financing. Compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the impact of 
unfavorable media coverage on cost of debt financing in state-owned enterprises is more sensitive. Therefore, the 
degree of unfavorable media coverage of state-owned listed companies increasing cost of debt financing will be 
greater than the degree of non-state-owned enterprises. Based on this, we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypotheses 3: Compared with state-owned listed companies, the impact of favorable media coverage on 
reducing cost of debt financing is more significantly on non-state-owned enterprises. 
Hypotheses 4: Compared with non-state-owned listed companies, the impact of unfavorable media coverage on 
increasing cost of debt financing is more significantly on state-owned enterprises. 
 
3. Sample and research design  
3.1 Sample  
This paper selects the data of A-share companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in the period 
2010-2014 as the research object, in order to ensure the reliability of the results, we conduct the following 
screening: First, delete the ST or *ST listed companies by SFC; Second, delete financial listed companies; Third, 
delete missing financial data, corporate governance data of listed companies. The final sample is 5988. The study 
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which relates to the financial data all come from Chinese financial database of Wind, corporate governance data 
from the sharp financial database, media coverage data mainly collected from China important Newspaper 
Database.( Hereinafter referred to as CCND) 
3.2 Variable definitions and measurement 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
Cost of debt financing: we use the following model to measure COD1 and COD2: 
COD1= (interest payment + commission charge + other financial expenses)/ the average annual debt. 
COD2= (interest payment + capitalization interest)/ the average annual debt 
3.2.2 Explanatory variables 
Media coverage MC: This paper use CNKI China important Newspaper Database as newspaper-based media 
data sources, according to the listed company stock code to collect manual data and judge the nature of the news 
reports. Favorable newspaper media coverage MCP is the annual number of favorable media coverage plus 1 and 
takes it the natural logarithm in CNKI China important Newspaper Database. Unfavorable newspaper media 
coverage MCN is the annual number of unfavorable media coverage plus 1 and takes it the natural logarithm in 
CNKI China important Newspaper Database. 
The nature of ownership: according to the nature of ownership of listed companies, this paper design the 
ownership of dummy variable PR, when the enterprise is state-owned ownership, PR is equal to 1, or PR is equal 
to 0. At the same time, this paper also design the cross term MC×PR between media coverage and the nature of 
ownership, it is mainly to investigate media coverage has a different impact on debt maturity structure of listed 
firms with different nature of ownership. 
3.2.3 Control variables 
Referring to the related research from Huang et al(2016), González(2015)、Ben-Nasr et al(2015), this paper 
selects the enterprise scale, profitability, cash flow ability, agency cost, the audit institution type, equity 
concentration, growth ability, the scale of the board of directors, proportion of independent directors and the 
scale of the board of supervisors, the annual dummy variables and industry dummy variables. The specific 
variables are defined as shown in table 1. 
 
4. Methodology 
In the field of media management, scholars have been plagued by the problem of endogenous. Heckman 
(1979) proposed the famous two-step estimation method, because its operation simple and does not rely on the 
normality assumption; it has gradually become the most popular method of solving sample selection bias. Based 
on the Heckman two-stage model, this paper constructs this model: 
This paper builds the following model to test the impact mechanism of favorable media coverage on cost of debt 
financing listed companies: 
The first stage, construct Probit estimation equation of newspaper media monitoring, estimating the inverse Mills 
ratio IMR.The details are as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15
=
              +
it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it
DMC Size ROE Lev Value Q GA EPS DPS
AO BD ID BS EC Year Industry
α α α α α α α α α
α α α α α α α ε
+ + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
      (1) 
Among them, DMC is two dummy variables of media coverage. When the variable of media coverage(MCP or 
MCN) is greater than median, the value is 1, otherwise 0.Control variables include firm size Size, profitability 
ROE, asset liability rate Lev, the company value Value, Tobin's Q, growth capability GA, dividend per share EPS, 
audit opinion AO, the scale of the board of directors BD, proportion of independent directors ID, the scale of the 
board of supervisors BS, ownership concentration EC, the annual dummy variables Year and industry dummy 
variables Industry. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and measures 
Types Variables Symbols Definitions and measurement 
Dependent 
variable Debt Financing Costs 
COD1 (interest payment + commission charge + other financial expenses)/ the average annual debt 
COD2 (interest payment + capitalization interest)/ the 
average annual debt 
Explanatory 
variable 
Media coverage MC Including favorable media coverage MCP and 
unfavorable media coverage MCN 
Favorable media 
coverage MCP 
The annual number of favorable media coverage plus 
1 and take it the natural logarithm in CCND  
Unfavorable media 
coverage MCN 
The annual number of unfavorable media coverage 
plus 1 and take it the natural logarithm in CCND 
Ownership Nature PR Dummy variable, when the enterprise is state-owned 
ownership, PR is equal to 1, or PR is equal to 0 
Control 
variable 
Enterprise scale Size the natural logarithm of total assets 
Profitability ROE Return on net assets 
Cash flow ability CF Net operating cash flow / total assets 
Agency cost AC Other receivables / total assets 
The audit institution 
type BIG4 
Dummy variable, when the audit institution for the 
international top four accounting firms, BIG4 is 
equal to 1, or BIG4 is equal to 0 
Equity concentration EC The proportion of the first largest shareholder 
Growth ability GA increase rate of business revenue 
The scale of the board 
of directors BD 
Natural logarithm of the total number of the board of 
directors 
proportion of 
independent directors ID 
The ratio of independent directors to the total number 
of the board of directors 
The scale of the board 
of supervisors BS 
Natural logarithm of the total number of the board of 
supervisors 
Annual dummy 
variables Year 
Control the annual macroeconomic impact, set 4 
annual dummy variable 
Industry dummy 
variables Industry 
Control industry factors, according to the 
Commission in 2012 the new industry classification 
guidelines, set 17 industry dummy variables 
 
The second stage, use the inverse Mills ratio IMR as control variable into the specific test mode. Investigate the 
impact mechanism of the media coverage on the cost of debt financing in listed companies. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14
= 4
           +
it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it
COD MCP Size ROE CF AC BIG EC GA
BD ID BS IMR Year Industry
β β β β β β β β β
β β β β β β σ
+ + + + + + + +
+ + + + + +
     (2) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14
= 4
           +
it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it
COD MCN Size ROE CF AC BIG EC GA
BD ID BS IMR Year Industry
δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ δ τ
+ + + + + + + +
+ + + + + +
       (3) 
Among them, COD is the cost of debt financing in i company in t years. It include COD1 and COD2. 
At the same time, to investigate unfavorable media coverage has a different impact on the cost of debt financing 
in listed companies under different ownership nature, this paper also constructs the test model as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
= 4
           +
it it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it it
COD MCP MCP PR PR Size ROE CF AC BIG
EC GA BD ID BS IMR Year Industry
χ χ χ χ χ χ χ χ χ
χ χ χ χ χ χ χ χ ζ
+ + × + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + +
    (4) 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
= 4
           +
it it it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it it
COD MCN MCN PR PR Size ROE CF AC BIG
EC GA BD ID BS IMR Year Industry
φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ
φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ υ
+ + × + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + +
      (5) 
Among them, MCPit×PRit is the cross term for favorable media coverage and ownership nature, MCNit×PRit is 
the cross term for unfavorable media coverage and ownership nature. 
 
5. Empirical results and analysis 
5.1 Summary statistics 
From descriptive statistics results in table 2, we can see that average forCOD1 is 0.064, while the average 
for COD2 is 0.059, indicating that the enterprise's debt financing costs is about 6%. At the same time, we 
find that some sample’s debt financing costs is 0, that maybe because that there is no need for the enterprise 
of debt financing in that year. The average value of the favorable media coverage MCP is 0.731, and the 
average value of the unfavorable media coverage MCN is 0.189. Because media coverage is the annual 
number of media coverage plus 1 and take it the natural logarithm, so we need to analysis the original data 
of media coverage to be aware of the condition of media coverage in real economic life. Statistics found 
that every listed company are reported in the newspaper every year by the number of 14.212 times, the 
number of favorable media coverage is 3.166, while the number of unfavorable media coverage is only 
1.360 in our country. The average value of the property right PR is 0.660, indicating that the data selected 
by this paper has 66% listed companies are state-owned property rights, this is mainly because existing 
listed companies in our country are mostly restructured by original state-owned companies. At the same 
time, in order to ensure that there is no multiple linear problems between the main variables of this paper, 
this paper also carries out the Pearson correlation test and Spearman correlation test. Test results show that 
there is a serious collinearity problem between main variables. Limited space, this paper does not list the 
correlation test results. 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variables Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
DMS1 0.304 0.168 0.338 0.000 1.000 
DMS2 0.271 0.115 0.103 0.000 0.730 
DMS3 0.119 0.048 0.160 0.000 0.859 
MCP 0.731 0.693 0.782 0.000 4.564 
MCN 0.189 0.000 0.404 0.000 2.996 
PR 0.660  1.000  0.474  0.000  1.000  
Size 22.316  22.185  1.425  13.076  28.509  
ROE 0.059  0.072  0.953  -54.809  4.485  
CF 0.036  0.038  0.181  -11.056  2.457  
AC 0.797  0.643  0.698  0.000  9.689  
BIG4 0.087  0.000  0.282  0.000  1.000  
EC 0.160 0.117 0.135 0.000 0.799 
GA 0.244 0.099 5.097 -1.000 367.532 
BD 2.521  2.485  0.306  1.386  3.738  
ID 0.347  0.333  0.097  0.000  0.750  
BS 1.610  1.609  0.447  0.000  3.045  
 
5.2 Media coverage and debt financing costs 
Table 3is the regression results of the impact of favorable media coverage on debt financing costs. On the 
one hand, favorable media coverage and the debt financing costs of listed companies. Seen from the he 
regression results of the table, the favorable media coverage MCP have a significant negative correlation 
with listed companies’ debt financing costs COD1 at the level of 0.01, and the influence coefficient is-
0.007. It can be illustrated that the favorable media coverage can help companies to decrease enterprise’s 
debt financing costs, then the research hypothesis 1 of this paper was confirmed. In addition, we can learn 
by the result taken COD2 as proxy variable of debt financing costs, the favorable media coverage MCP 
have a significant negative correlation with listed companies’ debt financing costs COD2 at the level of 
0.05, and the influence coefficient is-0.002.the results support the above conclusions, which can be further 
illustrate that the conclusion of the study is reliable. On the other hand, unfavorable media coverage and the 
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debt financing costs of listed companies. The unfavorable media coverage MCN has a significant positive 
correlation with listed companies’ debt financing costs COD1 at the level of 0.01, and the influence 
coefficient is0.010. It can be illustrated that the unfavorable media coverage can help companies to increase 
enterprise’s debt financing costs, then the research hypothesis 2 of this paper was confirmed. In addition, 
the unfavorable media coverage MCN have a significant positive correlation with listed companies’ debt 
financing costs COD2 at the level of 0.05, and the influence coefficient is0.004. The results can illustrate 
that the conclusion of the study is reliable. The research hypothesis 2 of this paper was confirmed. It is 
worth noting that the regression coefficient of Inverse Mills Ratios(IMR) of all the regression analysis in 
table 4 are not significant, this means that there are not sample self-selection problems in this research, 
which can illustrate that the conclusion of the study is reliable. 
Table 3. Regression results of Heckman model 
Variables COD1 COD2 MCP MCN MCP MCN 
Constant 0.285
***
 
(5.762) 
0.293*** 
(5.904) 
0.206*** 
(4.150) 
0.209***  
(4.201)   
MC -0.007
***
 
(-3.846) 
0.010***  
(4.162) 
-0.002**  
(-2.291) 
0.004**  
(2.521)   
Size -0.011
***
 
(-5.755) 
-0.011***  
(-5.781)   
-0.008*** 
(-4.057) 
-0.008*** 
(-4.077) 
ROE -0.025
***
 
(-3.588) 
-0.025***  
(-3.646) 
-0.023***  
(-3.294) 
-0.023***  
(-3.320) 
CF -0.061
***
 
(-4.056) 
-0.060***  
(-4.043) 
-0.007  
(-0.473)   
-0.007  
(-0.481) 
AC 0.010
***
  
(5.393) 
0.010***  
(5.422) 
0.005**  
(2.591) 
0.005** 
(2.599) 
BIG4 0.007
*
 
(1.953) 
0.007* 
(1.952) 
0.011*** 
(3.048) 
0.011** 
(3.041) 
EC -0.007  (-0.765) 
-0.007 
(-0.788) 
-0.020** 
(-2.168) 
-0.021* 
(-2.178) 
GA -0.001 (-0.937) 
-0.001  
(-0.904) 
-0.002  
(-1.108) 
-0.002  
(-1.097) 
BD 0.001  (0.165) 
0.000 
(0.091) 
0.002 
(0.480) 
0.002  
(0.448) 
ID 0.017  (1.444) 
0.017  
(1.455)   
0.013  
(1.138) 
0.013  
(1.139) 
BS -0.005
*
  
(-1.820) 
-0.005*  
(-1.825) 
-0.001  
(-0.362) 
-0.001 
(-0.362)  
IMR 0.005  (0.749) 
0.005 
(0.734) 
0.003  
(0.441) 
0.003  
(0.448) 
Year/Industry Control Control Control Control 
Wald Chi2 202.64*** 205.35*** 74.87*** 75.53*** 
N 5988 5988 5988 5988 
Note: ***,**,*indicate significance at 1%,5%,10%, respectively; T value are shown in brackets; in order to save 
space, the first stage estimation results of the Probit model are not listed in this paper, but interested readers can 
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email me for the details. 
 
5.3 Media coverage, ownership nature and debt financing costs  
Table 4 investigates the impact of media coverage on the debt financing costs of listed companies under 
different ownership nature. The cross term of favorable media coverage MCP and property right 
(MCP×PR) have a significant negative correlation with debt financing costs COD1 at the level of 0.05, and 
the influence coefficient is0.005. on this occasion, when the ownership nature is non-state-owned, the 
influential effect of favorable media coverage MCP on the debt financing costs of the non-state-owned 
listed companies was -0.011. While the ownership nature is state-owned, the influential effect of favorable 
media coverage on the debt financing costs of the state-owned listed companies was -0.006(-0.011+0.005). 
So, the impact of favorable media coverage MCP on non-state-owned listed company’s debt financing costs 
is bigger, so the research hypothesis 3 of this paper can be verified. It shows that compared with state-
owned listed companies, the impact of favorable media coverage on decreasing non-state-owned listed 
company’s debt financing costs is bigger. On the other hand, the cross term of favorable media coverage 
MCP and property right (MCP×PR) have a significant negative correlation with debt financing costs COD2 
at the level of 0.1, and the influence coefficient is 0.001, which is cosistent with the above conclusions. On 
addition, property right respectively has a significant negative correlation with debt financing costs at the 
level of 0.05 and 0.01, it shows that the debt financing costs of state-owned companies is significantly 
lower than the non-state-owned. 
Table 4. Regression results of Heckman model 
Variables COD1 COD2 MCP MCN MCP MCN 
Constant 0.276
***
 
(5.531) 
0.287*** 
(5.770) 
0.203*** 
(4.075) 
0.207*** 
(4.154) 
MCP -0.011
***
 
(-3.153)  
-0.003* 
(-1.901)  
MCP×PR 0.005
**
 
(-2.340)  
0.001* 
(1.765)  
MCN  0.014
***
 
(3.256)  
0.005** 
(2.082) 
MCN×PR  0.006
**
 
(2.242)  
0.002** 
(2.327) 
PR -0.002
**
 
(-2.447) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.731) 
-0.001** 
(-2.048) 
-0.001** 
(-2.358) 
Size -0.011
***
 
(-5.640) 
-0.011*** 
(-5.667) 
-0.008*** 
(-4.019) 
-0.008*** 
(-4.036) 
ROE -0.026
***
 
(-3.706) 
-0.026*** 
(-3.757) 
-0.023*** 
(-3.331) 
-0.023*** 
(-3.356) 
CF -0.061
***
 
(-4.100) 
-0.061*** 
(-4.085) 
-0.007  
(-0.464) 
-0.007** 
(-2.470) 
AC 0.010
***
  
(5.372) 
0.010*** 
(5.403) 
0.005**  
(2.592) 
0.048*** 
(-2.597) 
BIG4 0.007
**
 
(2.020) 
0.007** 
(2.017) 
0.011*** 
(3.068) 
0.011*** 
(-3.063) 
EC -0.005  (-0.576) 
-0.006 
(-0.621) 
-0.020** 
(-2.103) 
-0.020** 
(-2.114) 
GA -0.001  (-0.934) 
-0.001 
(-0.904) 
-0.002  
(-1.110) 
-0.002 
(-1.097) 
BD 0.001 (0.285) 
0.001 
(0.201) 
0.002  
(0.520) 
0.002 
(0.488) 
ID 0.018  (1.504) 
0.018 
(1.514) 
0.014  
(1.156) 
0.014 
(1.158) 
BS -0.004
*
 
(-1.664) 
-0.004 
(-1.652) 
-0.001  
(-0.299) 
-0.001 
(-0.295) 
IMR 0.478
***
 
(10.812) 
0.005 
(0.725) 
3.974*** 
(19.025) 
0.003 
(0.442) 
Year/Industry Control Control Control Control 
Wald Chi2 207.33*** 209.98*** 75.33*** 76.06*** 
N 5988 5988 5988 5988 
Note: ***,**,*indicate significance at 1%,5%,10%, respectively; T value are shown in brackets; in order to save 
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space, the first stage estimation results of the Probit model are not listed in this paper, but interested readers can 
email me for the details. 
 
5.4Sensitivity tests 
This article mainly take the following two methods of robustness test：On the one hand, we select other 
measurement method of media coverage. According to CNKI Chinese important newspaper full text database, 
we take the eight important Finance and economics newspapers which are "China Securities News", "Securities 
Daily", "Securities Times", "Shanghai Securities News", "the 21st century economy report", "Chinese business 
newspaper", "economy observes a newspaper", "Financial Times" as the resources of the data of media attention 
and then we collected and summarized the listed companies' news reports; On the other hand, we remove the 
noise in the data of media coverage. In the data collection of media coverage, there may be some listed 
companies did not have the media reports, and then the media coverage variable is 0. The paper has the test again 
after deleting the samples which media coverage variable is 0. Results from the robustness tests show no 
significant difference from our previous findings. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Debt financing costs is an important factor in debt contract, scholars do a lot of researches on how to decrease 
enterprise’s debt financing costs, which start with company’s characteristic factor, macro-environmental factors 
and corporate governance factor, exploring the factors influencing enterprise’s debt financing costs and gaining a 
certain researching achievement. The paper intends to start with the new angel of media coverage, selecting the 
firms listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai A-share stock exchanges in the period 2010-2014 as object of study, 
apply Heckman two-stage model to empirically test the impact mechanism of favorable and unfavorable media 
coverage on debt financing costs of listed companies, and explore the impact of media coverage on the debt 
financing costs under different ownership nature. The analysis results of this paper show that: Firstly. favorable 
media coverage and debt financing costs of listed companies are positive related. That is favorable media 
coverage can decrease the debt financing costs of a listed company. Secondly, unfavorable media coverage is 
negatively related to d debt financing costs of listed companies. Unfavorable media coverage can increase the 
debt financing costs. Thirdly, compared with the state-owned enterprises, the impact of favorable media 
coverage on decreasing debt financing costs is more apparent on non-state-owned enterprises. Fourthly, 
compared with the non-state-owned enterprises, the impact of unfavorable media coverage on increasing debt 
financing costs is more apparent on state-owned enterprises. That is the impact of unfavorable media coverage 
on increasing debt financing costs is more apparent on non-state-owned enterprises. 
In the future studies, we may have the following two questions worth exploring. First, we need to look for the 
path which media coverage influence corporate debt financing. Because the media does not have ownership of 
listed companies, the media coverage affect debt financing decision must be achieved through a certain path. 
This article only explores the impact of media coverage on the mechanism of debt financing, but did not study 
the role of the media coverage on the path to debt financing. Second, we need to consider the level of financial 
development. As we all know the level of debt financing decisions and regional financial development have a 
relatively close relationship, the higher level of financial development can provide a lot of favorable conditions 
for corporate debt financing. Therefore, future studies could examine the role of financial development between 
the media coverage and corporate debt financing role. 
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